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Abstract. the aim of this paper is to analyze one of the key concepts in Zhu Xi’s 
thought，Li 理，from the perspective of confucian ethics and to stress its importance 
in the strategic synthesis of Confucian thought realized by Zhu Xi in the 12th century. 
Focusing on the fundamental concepts of Neo-Confucian thought—Li (principle), Qi 
氣 (vital force), Dao 道 (the way/nature), Ren 仁 (humanity) and Xin 心 (mind-heart)—
the paper turns its attention to the inseparability of metaphysical and ontological 
perspectives on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the ethical perspective in the 
new Confucian paradigm. taking into consideration the various definitions given 
to the concept Li, this paper attempts an interpretation of the concept based on the 
ineluctability of the Confucian moral norms stated by Zhu Xi, according to which in 
the order of the world everything happens under the unavoidable sign of the necessity 
of its issuance. these findings suggest that Li is a concept composed of a sum of various 
aspects (li) resulting from the different instances of its issuance in the world with which 
the mind-heart governed by it is confronted, therefore proving that Li is the sum of 
moral norms that encompass humanity, righteousness, rites and wisdom, the pillars of 
the confucian moral order.
Zhu Xi and his strategic synthesis  
of Neo-Confucian concepts
Zhu Xi, the Chinese philosopher whose prestige earned him a place among the sacred 
classic thinkers Confucius, Mencius, lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, gave new meaning to 
confucian thought. the system that he proposed has dominated for centuries not 
only chinese thought, but also Korean and Japanese philosophies, and has served 
as the basis of the Confucian paradigm throughout asia. Zhu Xi’s contribution was 
not limited to the spheres of thinking, ethics or governing, but it had preponderant 
influence in these fields. Zhu Xi adopted the concept of humanity (ren 仁) from 
confucius, the doctrine of virtue and humanity from Mencius, the idea of authenticity 
(cheng 誠) from the Zhong yong (The Doctrine of the Mean),1 and the methods of 
reaching the correct way described in the Da xue2 (The Great Learning), which he 
1  Zhong Yong (the Doctrine of the Mean), initially a chapter of the classical book Li ji (The 
Book of Rites), was included by Zhu Xi in the collection of the Four Books (Si shu), the new Confu-
cian canon from the song.
2 大学 Da xue (the Great learning) was, similarly to Zhong yong, initially a chapter of the 
classic Li ji, later to be included by Zhu Xi in the confucian canon of the Four Books.
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combined with Daoist elements such as the cosmic forces yin-yang, with the five 
elements (water, fire, wood, metal and earth), and with Buddhist concepts, realizing a 
synthesis of the most important ideas of the neo-confucian scholars at the beginning 
of the song Dynasty in china (12th century). Zhu Xi thus established an orthodoxy of 
transmitting confucian thought from confucius and Mencius through Zhou Dunyi, 
Zhang Zai, cheng Hao and cheng Yi, his fundamental innovation consisting in 
selecting and grouping the four Confucian classics, known as the Four Books (The 
Analects, The Book of Mencius, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean), 
in a canonical corpus. as a result, these books were commented on and interpreted in 
a new light, not only by Zhu Xi, but also by his successors. Zhu Xi himself followed 
the Confucian scholarly tradition of transmitting the classical texts, which he also 
reinterpreted and brought up to date (to the beginning of the song Dynasty) giving 
them a new complexity. Some of Zhu Xi’s most influential works, reunited in the 
collection Zhu zi yu lei (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu), are a synthesis of 
Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist texts and fundamental concepts, but at the same time, 
it is an original, primary work. the originality of Zhu Xi’s synthesis can be easily 
seen in his approach to the problem of Li 理 (Principle) and Qi 氣 (vital force or 
manifestation), major concepts of Neo-Confucian thought and, due extensively to 
Zhu Xi’s work, concepts that form the common basis of Neo-Confucian metaphysics 
and ethics in east Asia (china, Korea, and Japan).
The synthesis-consistency of the paradigm
the Master says: 
‘the accomplished scholar is not a utensil’ (Lunyu 2.12 )3
the fundamental concepts of Neo-Confucian thought―Tai ji 太極 (the Great Ultimate), 
Li (principle), Qi (vital force), Dao 道 (the way/nature), Ren (humanity)―discussed 
by various Chinese thinkers before Zhu Xi, were developed and systematized by 
Master Zhu in an effort to explain, as clearly as possible, the Confucian doctrine 
according to which the human being finds his harmonious place in the universe. this 
cosmological vision is based on the fundamental idea of the integration of the micro-
universe into macrocosmic structures in the context of inter-relations established on 
the axis tian 天 (Heaven)-di 地 (earth/ world)-ren 人 (man). From a phenomenological 
perspective, the world is governed by Dao, on the fundamental elements of which, Li 
(principle) and Qi (manifestation), existence as a whole depends. on the ethical level, 
universal harmony is reflected in society and governed by the sum of all principles, 
Tai ji (the Great Ultimate), which makes it possible for all the manifestations of 
3  ‘子曰: 君子不器。’
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human nature to integrate in the Dao. Having as a starting point the concept of Tai ji, 
explained thoroughly by the Neo-Confucian master Zhou Dunyi,4 and combining it 
with the concept Li, proposed by the cheng brothers,5 Zhu Xi developed his thesis that 
declared tai ji has no physical form but is the principle par excellence, the complete 
and perfect rendition of Li (Zhu zi yu lei 49).6 What then is Li?
From metaphysical and ontological perspectives, all principles are reunited in 
the Tai ji, which is present in all things as a whole and in each and every thing in 
particular. the relationship between the governing principle of the universe and that 
of each individual thing is the relationship between the whole and parts. Wing-tsit 
chan rightfully compares this relationship to the moonlight that shines over various 
things in nature; each thing has its own reflection, but the moonlight itself remains 
one. What becomes obvious in each thing is the principle of the things (Li), made overt 
by the presence of the vital force (Qi). then Li becomes the fundamental principle for 
the understanding of the world and of the universality of things. Li, as explained by 
Cheng Yi and after him by Zhu Xi, is immaterial, one, whole, eternal and unchanging. 
it constitutes the essence of things, but it does not create, it does not give birth to 
the myriad things. the agent of creation is the vital force Qi, the necessary basis or 
program for the manifestation of Li. Li and Qi cannot be separated. Zhu Xi explains 
the interdependence of Li and Qi by an idea inherited from his predecessor, cheng Yi: 
Li (the principle) is one, but its manifestations in the world are multiple. the various 
aspects of li, which are to be found in all things and phenomena, are the individual 
li, and the one Li that they all share is the universal Li, which could be defined as the 
sum of lis. Zhu Xi also provides a condition for its existence: ‘Li inevitably exists 
where Qi coagulates’ (Zhu zi yu lei 1.3).7 all things consist of a structure in which 
Li (principle) and Qi (matter) are bound together. the Li of things arises from the 
encounter with a certain situation or state of affairs (as we shall see later), while the 
li of a thing resides in its own nature, real and definite―xing 性. Original nature 
is pure, unchanged Li and is good in essence, while by taking shape and becoming 
something, it is not pure anymore since it merges with the vital force, Qi, and passes, 
on the ontological level, into a new state which includes the notions of both good and 
bad. on the phenomenological level, the two types of xing—the original nature (pure 
4  Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), also known as Master lin Qi, was the first to explain the principles 
of Neo-Confucian metaphysics and ethics in his works Tai ji tu (The Diagram of the Great Ultimate) 
and Tai ji tu shuo (The Diagram of the Great Ultimate Explained).
5  Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107) were Neo-Confucian philosophers (and 
brothers) with similar opinions on the essence of Confucianism and who developed their thoughts 
on the idea of Li.
6  ‘理 氣 上, 太 極 天 地 上: ‘氣 理也。’ 
7  ‘只此气 凝取處理便在其中。’
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Li) and the derived nature (Qi)—are bound together, one being the essence and the 
other the manifestation of things. according to Zhu Xi, that which unites them is the 
mind-heart (xin 心), the embodiment of the manifestation of Qi. the concept xing, 
with its value of human nature adopted from Mencius, has a crucial importance for 
the Neo-Confucian thinkers, as it has a direct influence on the idea of morality and 
also on the idea of knowing. Governed by the principle (li), human nature (xing), just 
as the universal nature of things, is opened to the possibility of knowing since all the 
things in the universe are interrelated and experience reciprocal influence. thus, the 
human has the possibility of chiselling his nature and thereby perfect himself. this 
requires the constant effort of investigating things (ge wu 格物) or ‘apprehending the 
principle in things’ (Gardner 1990, 117) and reaching knowledge. Zhu Xi adopts the 
ideas of Cheng Yi about the necessity of understanding and knowing the principle 
Li through the effort of investigating things.8 For Zhu Xi, propagator of traditional 
Confucian values and ideals, the utmost knowledge and the supreme understanding 
of things is knowing ren (humanity). the evaluation of this concept culminates with 
Zhu Xi’s description stating that ren is the principle of goodness above all, thus having 
the status of cosmic virtue. From this perspective, the concept of humanity identifies 
with Li. thus, we can see that Li encompasses several different meanings that we will 
discuss further.
Li―causality and necessity
As Yung sik Kim mentions in his book, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi, the term 
Li is difficult to define. this difficulty is further deepened by the fact that it is almost 
impossible to translate the term, as there is no one single Western word to encompass 
all the possible meanings of Li. Li is most often translated as ‘principle’.9 But Li 
has also been translated as reason, law, rule, order, form, pattern, and coherence. 
Wing-tsit Chan gives an account of the different translations of Li in the chapter 
‘On translating certain chinese Philosophical terms’ of his book Reflections on 
Things at Hand. Yung sik Kim mentions that Willard Peterson suggested coherence 
as an alternative translation of the concept in his article Another Look at Li (1986). 
Joseph needham (1985) suggests the term organization, based on the idea of organic 
philosophy that all things are made of parts which work together on the basis of a 
8  Cheng Yi gives special importance to learning, being convinced that the physical world and 
the ethical one are governed by a rational principle (Li), which man has to know and comply with. 
Zhu Xi adopted this idea and developed on its basis his theory about the investigation of things.
9  Zhang Dainian translated by edmund ryden in Zhang Dainian 2002; Gardner 1990; Chan 
Wing-tsit 1963; A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy tomoeda 1985; Berthrong 2005; Shimada 
1992; Yun 1990; etc.
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guiding principle. a.C. Graham (1986) translates it as a pattern that governs things 
and events, while Fung Yulan (1953)10 saw in Li an equivalent of the Platonic form. 
each interpreter of Zhu Xi’s texts reconstructs the concept, proposes a new dominant 
dimension of it, and redefines it. We propose an interpretation of the concept Li based 
on the moral norms that trigger the physical necessity of the principle.
Zhu Xi did not provide an explicit definition of Li, but he did explain that there 
are many individual li for all things, phenomena, state of affairs, etc. and that there is 
the one Li for the whole of the myriad things. all the individual li are manifestations 
of the one Li.11 Li has two main features that apply to each thing in nature: the reason 
by which a thing is as it is and the rule according to which things ought to be. For all 
things under heaven there must be a ‘reason by which a thing is as it is (所以然之固 
suo yi ran zhi gu)’ and a ‘rule according to which things ought to be (所当然之则 suo 
dang ran zhi ze)’. these are called li (Daxue huowen 1.11b–12a).
although the issue of why a thing is as it is is different than that of what a thing 
ought to be, they are directly linked and always combined, as Zhu Xi’s idea of Li 
includes both natural and moral norms. in Daxue huowen (Questions and Answers on 
the Great Learning), Zhu Xi states:
truly everything has what is rightful/what ought to be and cannot be otherwise. We should 
however delve into the reason why things are as they are. the reason why things are as 
they are is Li. Being such, Li is unchangeable. When one sees a child drowning in a well, 
he feels fright and pity. the feeling arising in this situation is what cannot be avoided as it 
is what ought to be. Why so? it is because there inevitably exists the unchanging way (dao 
li) (Daxue huowen 57.13a1).12
the phrase suo dang ran can be translated as what ought to be or dang wei (当为), 
which can also be translated as acquainted/confronted with so and so. then the phrase 
would read: What cannot be abandoned when confronted with such state of affairs/
myriad things/objects and phenomena of the world. Being confronted with the sight 
of a child drowning in a well anyone would unavoidably feel pity. in this case we can 
say that suo dang ran could be read as coming in contact with a certain  state of things. 
What ought to be is found in the following term, bu rong ji (不容已), what cannot be 
otherwise. What ought to be and cannot be avoided for Zhu Xi occurs only when 
someone is confronted with this state of things. in this case, the issue of why things 
are what they are is directly connected with being confronted with a certain state of 
10  Graham 1986; Fung Yulan 1953.
11  ‘All things have li. as a whole they are simply the one Li’ (Zhu Zi yu lei 94.8bo).
12  the concept dao li 道理 is often translated as moral principle. However, since li is a holistic 
concept that comprises not only the norms of the natural order by which a thing is what it is and not 
able to change into something else, but also the norms of moral order by which a thing ought to be 
what it is and cannot determine its own acts, we chose to translate dao li as the unchanging way.
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things and what things ought to be. this is because there inevitably is the unchanging 
way. in other words, as we are confronted with the state of things, something that 
cannot be avoided (what ought to be) occurs in our mind. the reason for this is the 
unchanging way. therefore, the unchanging way is a necessary condition. Not only 
the state of things and what ought to be, but also what ought to be and its necessity 
are connected in a conditional circle. From a relational perspective, if the reason for a 
thing is necessary, the thing itself is also necessary. if the reason for what ought to be 
is necessary, then what ought to be is also necessary. in this case, Zhu Xi’s statement 
can be read as what cannot be avoided when confronted with the state of things is 
the unchanging way. therefore, what ought to be in Zhu Xi’s context is a sufficient 
condition of necessity. 
necessity is a property of Dao, the reason for what ought to be and cannot be 
avoided when confronted with the state of things. For Zhu Xi, the state of things 
that man is confronted with is important (the things that man is not acquainted with 
have little significance). the following lines illustrate this: ‘as we look at something 
immediate to us, our own body, we can see that all li are present in it’ (Reflections on 
Things at Hand 1: 33). the necessity of Li exists where there is what ought to be. if Li, 
possessing necessity as its property, resides in the state of things, consequently, what 
ought to be exists in that state of things. on the other hand, there is the importance of 
being confronted with the state of things as a condition, in which case what ought to 
be resides in one’s mind. the mind confronting a state of things results in a resonance 
between the li of the mind and the li of things. ‘the mind of man embraced the myriad 
manifestations of principle [i.e. Li]; thus, as it confronted things, the mind could 
through a sort of resonance sense the principle in those things. A natural response 
occurred between principle in one’s mind and in the things [i.e. state of things] before 
that mind’ (Gardner 1990, 53).
Zhu Xi, conceptualizes the mind-heart as a physical space of just half an inch (fang 
cun 方寸) in which the moral mind originating in the principle (Li) becomes one with 
the human mind (with feelings and desires) originating in the vital force (Qi). the 
human mind constantly gives in to human desires, while the moral mind is subtle 
and responds to moral duty, possible only through moral discipline. Moral discipline 
presupposes nourishing (cun yang 存養) the original moral mind when the principle 
is still not manifested, but also self-examination (xing cha 省察) when Li starts acting 
through the vital force Qi. Zhu Xi thus insists that this moral effort is necessary and at 
the same time unavoidable since it is also part of the natural order of things. 
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The aspects of Li
‘[li] principle is not some separate thing in front of us; rather it’s in our minds’ 
(Zhu Zi yu lei 9.7b:1/155:9; Gardner 1990, 3.27, p. 124).
if there is a rule of what ought to be governing the way things are then the li of one 
state of things with which the mind is confronted is an aspect of Li, of that one Li 
which in Zhu Xi’s opinion things and the mind share. the li in things and the mind 
are originally one thing. the two do not have even a small gap between them. But it 
is necessary that i should respond to them [i.e., the li in things]. things and the mind 
share this li. the various aspects of li that are to be found in all things and phenomena 
are the individual li, and the one Li that they all share is the universal Li, which could 
be defined as a sum of lis. 
When confronted with the state of things, the mind comes in contact with the 
various aspects of Li. ‘the mind embraces the myriad manifestations of the principle. 
the myriad manifestations of principle are embodied in the one mind’ (Zhu Zi yu 
lei 9.7a:3/155:1; Gardner 1990, 3.23, p. 123). then what is the Li of the mind, that 
which governs the ought to be of things? in Zhu Xi’s own words: ‘Humanity (ren) is 
the correct Li of the mind’ (Zhu Zi yu lei 45.4b3). Having as a characteristic that by 
which things ought to be, Li is also the sum of moral norms. therefore it encompasses 
仁 (humanity), 义 (righteousness), 礼 (rites), and 知 (wisdom), the pillars of the 
confucian moral order. recent studies in neo-confucianism agree that the moral 
side of the definition of Li is predominant for Zhu Xi (de Bary 1989; kim 2000; 
tillman 1992; etc.), as are his illustrations in terms of what things ought to be rather 
than what makes a thing be as it is (Kim 2000, 24).
Zhu Xi makes clear the conditional relation of the two concepts: only after there is 
Li is there Qi, and there has to be Qi in order for Li to exist (Zhu Zi yu lei 1.1b7, 4.15a2, 
95.13a21.1b7, 87.23b2). ‘When there is Li, but no Qi, Li has nowhere to stand. only 
after there is Qi does Li have somewhere to stand’ (Zhu Zi yu lei 94.14a2). so Li is 
provided a place to ‘stand’ by Qi, which becomes the expression of Li. this would be 
the ontological side of the Li-Qi relationship. On the other hand, Zhu Xi establishes a 
logical aspect of the relationship between Li and Qi: ‘When there is Li for “this”, then 
“this” Qi flows, moves, grows and nourishes the myriad things’ (Zhu Zi yu lei 1.1bo).13 
Li comes to be realized in the process of being localized by Qi. if Qi is the substance 
or the form, then Li appears to have little additional content beyond the things or state 
of things of which it is the li, becoming thus the definition of things (kim 2000, 26). Li 
cannot be seen by Zhu Xi as having an existence apart from the things or phenomena 
13  ‘有 此 理, 便 有 此 氣 流 行 發 育 。’
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of which it is the li, because for him Li is in Qi (which constitutes everything in the 
world) or in the mind (which is confronted with everything in the world) (Zhu Zi yu 
lei 1.2b1, 5.3b6, 9.6b1).
Hearing the Way
‘if a man in the morning hears the right way, 
he may die in the evening without regret’ (Lunyu 4.8)14
Zhu Xi’s intellectual approach can be included in what is called by Confucius ‘hearing 
the Way’. the Way (Dao 道) can be the way of the mind, which seizes the li of what 
ought to be in a strictly ethical interpretation, but it can also be the way of the old, 
the models of human perfection, and the way of understanding everything in the 
world. the Way is either revealed for the ones who are born learned (sheng ren 聖
人) or it is known through continuous intellectual effort by a continuous and gradual 
process of learning (zhi 知). For Zhu Xi, learning and knowing are part of Dao, in its 
utmost expression Li, the sense, reason and principle of things, which serves more 
effectively to explain the transformation of unity into multiplicity. Zhu Xi’s Way is 
that of moral self-cultivation, for which he identifies steps to be followed in order 
to perfect oneself. at the heart of his prescriptive efforts lies study, or learning. in 
one chapter of the Greater Learning, Zhu Xi states: ‘the first step of the instruction 
in greater learning is to teach the student, whenever he encounters anything at all 
in the world, to build upon what is already known to him of principle and to probe 
still further, so that he seeks to reach the limit’ (Gardner 1990, 118). in this way one 
can become enlightened and is able to understand the Li of things. Another step in 
perfecting oneself is gaining reverent seriousness. Zhu Xi says: ‘i heard cheng Yi say 
that self-cultivation requires reverent seriousness (jing 敬)’ (Zhu Zi yu lei 12:338). 
reverence and seriousness, encompassed in the concept jing are, as Zhu Xi himself 
states, fundamental ideas in the confucian school since they are proof that the mind-
heart (xin) is its own master. this is a quality that is inborn for the sage (sheng ren) 
and cultivated for the scholar (shi 士). confucius says about the latter: ‘the scholar 
dedicates himself wholly to the Way’ (Lunyu 4.9). 
For the superior man (jun zi 君子), reverent seriousness is accompanied by 
authenticity/truthfulness (cheng 誠).15 the concept first appeared in the confucian 
classic Zhong yong, but with Zhu Xi’s reiteration it reached the status of a concept 
with a fundamental role in the Confucian system of thought. By authenticity, Zhu 
14  ‘子曰: 朝聞道，夕夕死可矣。’
15  Concept adopted by Zhu Xi from the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhou Dunyi, who defines the 
quality of the sage by the term cheng.
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Xi understands the capacity of the human being to actualize his moral potential and 
render valuable his good human nature.16
Zhu Xi transfers the idea of authenticity from the level of individual moral 
perfection to the level of intellectual chiselling. He follows this model of practical 
training himself. He knows how to approach the object of study and how to 
proceed to understand it. in the case of a text, he possesses the art of analyzing and 
understanding the text and grasping its essence. like Zhuang Zi’s butcher Ding, who 
masters the art of cutting open ox carcasses, Zhu Xi knows how to open up the text, 
to operate hermeneutically, and to see not with the eyes, but with his spirit.17 it is 
a ceremony, a ritual of appropriation in the sense identified by Baudrillard in the 
concept of ceremony, which ‘exalts the definitively factual and conventional order of 
the world, the occult objectivity that shines behind the subjectivity of appearances’ 
(Baudrillard 1996). Desire and hazard are excluded from the ceremony. this is the art 
of apprehending the principle of things with one’s mind-heart (xin). in the order of the 
world, everything happens under the unavoidable sign of the necessity of its issuance. 
thus the circle closes and the neo-confucian master reiterates the ideas of the iconic 
confucian master. in the Analects, Confucius says: ‘in his dealings with the world 
the superior man is not invariably for or against anything. He will follow what is as 
it ought to be’ (Lunyu 4.10). 
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